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1 Introduction 
In recent years Europe has faced an increasing wave of so-called ‘lone actor’ attacks 
committed by jihadist (or jihadist-inspired) terrorists. This trend has continued in 
2017. For example, the attacks in London and Stockholm, which were simple but 
devastating in their methodology. Both attacks used vehicles to run pedestrians 
down. While the London attacker disembarked to engage in a deadly knife attack, 
an unexploded bomb was subsequently found in the truck used in the Stockholm at-
tack1. As has been noted by commentators, all of these methods have been de-
scribed in detail in recent ‘how-to-guide’ articles in English language jihadist maga-
zines, such as in the ‘Open Source Jihad’ (OSJ) section of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula’s (AQAP) Inspire magazine and the ‘Just Terror’ (JT) section of ISIS’ Rumi-
yah magazine. These trends have re-opened the debate about the role and impact of 
such ‘how-to’ guides in provoking violence by providing would-be terrorists with 
the practical knowledge to carry out such attacks. Drawing on content analyses of 
Inspire and Rumiyah magazines, we argue that groups like ISIS and AQAP under-
stand that their instructional material is of little value unless they can convince 
supporters to adopt their ‘competitive system of meaning’ (i.e. their way of perceiv-
ing the world, its actors and events). Thus it would be wrong to focus myopically on 
‘how-to’ operational guides when trying to understand and counter violent extrem-
ist propaganda. This paper begins by exploring the history of instructional material 
in terrorist propaganda before going on to examine the role of Inspire’s OSJ section 
and Rumiyah’s JT section within the broader context of the groups’ messaging ef-
forts. It concludes by outlining CT-CVE strategic communications recommendations 
for both proactively undermining this type of violent extremist messaging and re-
sponding post-incident to directed versus inspired attacks. 
  
                                                        
1
E. Allen & B. Henderson: Westminster attack: Everything we know so far about the events in London. In: The 
Telegraph http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/22/westminster-terror-attack-everything-know-far/ (26 
March 2017); L. Dearden: Stockholm attack: 'Homemade bomb' found in lorry used to kill at least four people 
in Sweden Suspect arrested on suspicion of murder and terror offences. In: The Independent 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/stockholm-attack-sweden-lorry-truck-crash-terror-isis-
islamic-state-manhunt-latest-suspect-police-a7673527.html (8 April 2017) 
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2 Historical Overview of Instructional Material 
The history of modern instructional material can be traced back to at least the late-
1800s and bomb-making manuals produced by anarchist groups, a trend that con-
tinued to grow in the 1900s, with examples such as the Mini-Manual of the Urban 
Guerrilla, the Anarchist Cookbook and The Turner Diaries.2 Meanwhile, groups like 
the original Irish volunteers were including ‘how-to guide’ sections in their maga-
zine, ‘An T'Oglach’, as early as the 1920s.3 In short, the ‘how-to guide’ sections in ji-
hadist magazines are not particularly unique. Indeed, as is so often the case, these 
materials should be seen as merely strategic plagiarising of best practice. 
History provides extensive examples of terror attacks that were carried out using 
modi operandi gained from ‘how-to guides’. From the Haymarket Square bombing 
in 1886,4 in which The Science of Revolutionary Warfare is alleged to have provided 
instruction for the bombers to The Turner Diaries which, since its publication in 
1978, has inspired attacks resulting in over two hundred deaths, including the 1995 
Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh – the single deadliest act of domestic 
terrorism in U.S. history.5 What is important about The Turner Diaries, and this 
gives the key to understanding the role of OSJ and JT, is that the instructional mate-
rial is embedded within a narrative designed to justify and inspire such attacks, in-
cluding ideological justifications and frantic calls to action. McVeigh did not just 
draw out operational guidance from reading The Turner Diaries, his world view was 
shaped by the ‘competitive system of meaning’ espoused within its narratives. Simi-
larly, the key to understanding how magazines like Inspire and Rumiyah may moti-
vate supporters to engage in terrorism is to understand how OSJ and JT within the 
same broader context. 
                                                        
2
 A. Larabee: A Brief History of Terrorism in the United States. In: Knowledge, Technology & Policy 16, p.21 
(2003) 
3
 The Official Organ of the Irish Volunteers. In: T'Oglach Magazine 3(31), p.3 
http://www.militaryarchives.ie/collections/online-collections/an-toglach-
magazine/results?title=&subtitle=&text=&pubdate=1921 (21 October 1921) 
4
 K. Anderson: The History of Do-It-Yourself Weapons and Explosives Manuals in America. In: Lawfare 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/history-do-it-yourself-weapons-and-explosives-manuals-america (21 June 
2016) 
5
 J.M Berger, “The Turner Legacy: The Storied Origins and Enduring Impact of White Nationalism’s Deadly Bi-
ble”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 8 (2016) https://icct.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/ICCT-Berger-The-Turner-Legacy-September2016-2.pdf. 
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3 Decline of Training Camps and the Move to Individual Ji-
had 
In his analysis of how Europe’s jihadis gained their training, Peter Nesser noticed 
that there were two distinct generations. The first “generation networks that were 
closely associated with Al Qaeda and received terrorist training in Al Qaeda run 
camps in Afghanistan”6, which carried out attacks in Europe from 1998 until 
2003/4, a couple of years after the destruction of the training camps. The second 
“generation networks that have weaker or more indirect ties to Al Qaeda and pre-
sumably have found alternative ways to obtain training after Al Qaeda camps were 
destroyed”, emerging as a European threat from 2003/4 onwards.7 In contrast to 
the first, the second “generation activists, the “home grown” terrorists, operated 
quite autonomously” from the militant groups that inspired them,8 seemingly high-
lighting a transition to a new terrorist wave, that Sageman would describe as “con-
sists mostly of would-be terrorists, who, angered by the invasion of Iraq, aspire to 
join the movement and the men they hail as heroes. But it is nearly impossible for 
them to link up with al Qaeda Central, which was forced underground after 9/11. 
Instead, they form fluid, informal networks that are self-financed and self-trained. 
They have no physical headquarters or sanctuary, but the tolerant, virtual envi-
ronment of the Internet offers them a semblance of unity and purpose. Theirs is a 
scattered, decentralized social structure-a leaderless jihad”.9 
The notion of leaderless or individual jihad is not new, and can be found in the writ-
ings and lectures of influential jihadi strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri back in the 
1990s. In his strategic concept that became known as “The Global Islamic Re-
sistance”, al-Suri highlighted lone wolf attacks carried out by individuals with no di-
rect connection to AQ, but which where nevertheless carried out in support of AQ 
global Ideology10. In 2003, following Al-Qaeda’s routing from Afghanistan it sought 
to re-calibrate its military strategy, adopting an approach aimed at exhausting the 
                                                        
6
 P. Nesser: How did Europe's Global Jihadis Obtain Training for their Militant Causes? In: Terrorism and Politi-
cal Violence 20(2) http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546550801920758 (2008)  
7
 Ibid, 235 
8
 Ibid, 241 
9
 M. Sageman: The Next Generation of Terror. In: Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/08/the-
next-generation-of-terror/ (8 October 2009) 
10
 A. Stenersen: Bomb-Making for Beginners: Inside al an Al-Qaeda E-Learning Course. In: Perspectives on Ter-
rorism 7(1) http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/241/html (2013) 
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enemy by attacking his interests world wide11. This new strategy would in turn 
have a direct impact on how Al-Qaeda trained its operatives. As Kohlmann articu-
lates “Given its weakened position, al Qaeda no longer had the luxury of importing 
large numbers of unskilled operatives into Afghanistan solely for the purpose of 
training, only to then immediately export them elsewhere. With a renewed empha-
sis on self-financed, self-trained, and self-motivated terrorist cells, Bin Laden’s 
aides began ardently working to spread their collective knowledge and practical 
skills over the Internet”.12 
This change of strategic direction, would require a new approach to training re-
cruits to replace training camps, both for practical and ideological instruction. The 
real challenge with the move to individual jihad, would be how to inspire and moti-
vate individuals into action without direct contact. The internet would soon fill this 
void with jihadist propaganda designed to inspire individual jihad. Soon English 
language magazines such as AQ’s Inspire, and ISIS’ Dabiq and then Rumiyah would 
emerge. The objective of the former has been described as “Inspire is characterized 
by a streamlined and seamless fusion of ideologically driven material with prag-
matic instructional and skill-building content. Taken together, these elements are 
intended simultaneously to increase motivation and lower the barriers of entry to 
terrorism, with the aim of fostering a do-it-yourself ethos resulting in terrorist be-
haviors”. 13 In the section below we give an overview of the instructional material in 
OSJ and JT. 
  
                                                        
11
 E.F. Kohlmann: “Homegrown” Terrorists: Theory and Cases in the War on Terror's Newest Front: In: The An-
nals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618(1), p. 98 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002716208317203 (2008) 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 A.F. Lemieux, et al.: Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the 
Lens of the Information. In: Terrorism and Political Violence 26(2), p.355 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2013.828604 (2014) 
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4 Inspire – ‘Open Source Jihad’ 
Inspire magazine was first published by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
in January 2010, the brainchild of Americans, Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan. The 
magazine was notable for its engaging format, its focus on inspiring followers to 
engage in ‘individual jihad’ against the west, and its ‘how-to-guide’ section ‘Open 
Source Jihad’. OSJ covered a wide variety of technical advice (see Table 1) from 
training in the use of encryption to using firearms and building home-made bombs. 
What is particularly interesting about Inspire’s OSJ section is the variety of instruc-
tional advice it provides supporters, from methods requiring relatively high levels 
of sophistication, such as improvised explosive devices, to vehicular and arson at-
tacks. The technical advice gained from OSJ has been cited by law enforcement in 
many successful and foiled terrorist attacks, most notably the 2013 Boston Bomb-
ing in which the pressure cooker bomb used was based on OSJ instructions.14 Re-
flecting the tendency for Western jihadists to be undiscerning in the propaganda 
they consume, OSJ guides have apparently influenced ‘homegrown terrorists’ 
whose attacks were preceded by a pledge of allegiance to AQ’s rival, ISIS (e.g. San 
Bernadino shooters).15 
  
                                                        
14
 H.A. Sarat-St. Peter: “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom”: Jihadist Tactical Technical Communication 
and the Everyday Practice of Cooking. In: Technical Communication Quarterly 26(1), p.77 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10572252.2016.1275862?journalCode=htcq20 (2017); A.F. 
Lemieux, et al.: Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance and Potential Impact Through the Lens 
of the Information, p.355 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546553.2013.828604 (2014) 
15
 H.A. Sarat-St. Peter: “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom”: Jihadist Tactical Technical Communication 
and the Everyday Practice of Cooking. In: Technical Communication Quarterly 26(1), p.77 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10572252.2016.1275862?journalCode=htcq20 (2017) 
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Table 1: Inspire’s ‘Open Source Jihad’ Section 
Inspire 
Magazine 
Open Source Jihad (Instructional Material) 
Issue 1 
 
 “Make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom”, The AQ Chef 
“How to use Asrar al-Mujahideen: Sending & Receiving Encrypted Messages”, 
Terr0r1st 
Issue 2  
 
 “The ultimate mowing machine”, Yahya Ibrahim  
“Asrar Al-Mujahideen 2.0 extras”, Terr0r1st  
Issue 3  (Special Issue)  
Issue 4 
 
“Destroying Buildings”, AQ Chef 
“Training with the AK”, Abu Salih  
“Advice for those who want to help Al-Malahem Media”, Terr0r1st  
Issue 5  “Training with the AK 2”, Abu Salih  
Issue 6  
 
“Training with the AK”, Abu Saleh  
“Making acetone peroxide”, Dr Khateer  
Issue 7 (Special Issue)  
Issue 8  
 
 “Training with the handgun”, Abu Saleh  
“Remote control detonation”, Dr. Khateer  
Issue 9  
 
 “The convoy of martyrs: Rise up and board with us”  
“It is your freedom to ignite a firebomb”, The AQ Chef  
“Qualities of an urban assassin”, Uthman Ibn Al-Ightiyal  
Issue 10  
 
 “Torching parked vehicles”, Ibnul Irhab 
“Causing road accidents”, AQ Chef 
“You ask, we answer”, AQ Consultant 
Issue 11 (Special Issue)  
Issue 12 
 
 “Car bombs inside America”, AQ Chef 
“Car bomb: Field data”, AQ Chef 
Issue 13  
 
 “The hidden bomb”  
“Breaching security barriers”, The AQ Chef  
“Making the hidden bomb”, The AQ Chef 
“Field Tactics” External Operations Reconnaissance Team 
Issue 14  
 
 “Assassination Operations” 
“Designing a timed hand grenade”, The AQ Chef 
“Assassinations Field Tactics” Reconnaissance Team 
Issue 15  
 
“Professional Assassinations”, Prepared by the External Operations Team  
“Home Assassinations: Parcel Bomb, Magnet Car Bomb, Door-Trap Bomb”, The AQ 
Chef  
Inspire 16  
 
(Special Issue) 
5 Rumiyah – ‘Just Terror’ 
First published in September 2016, Islamic State’s Rumiyah magazine, translated as 
‘Rome’, is a reference to the Hadith in which the Prophet Mohamed declared that 
the Muslim armies would conquer Constantinople and then Rome. Unlike its prede-
cessor magazine Dabiq, Rumiyah’s ‘Just Terror Tactics’ section offers its readers in-
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structional guidance for engaging in terrorist attacks. Detailed in Table 2, Rumiyah’s 
JT section is not unique in the operational advice that it provides readers with, 
similar content featuring in Inspire (not to mention often years earlier too). JT has 
tended to focus on simpler, less sophisticated types of attacks whereas Inspire 
tended to offer a mix. While drawing causal links between JT and recent attacks is 
problematic, analysts have noted the similarity in JT’s operational advice and the 
Berlin Christmas market, Westminster and Stockholm attacks.16 
Table 2: Rumiyah’s ‘Just Terror Tactics’ Section 
Rumiyah 
Magazine 
Just Terror Tactics (Instructional Material) 
Issue 1 
 
- 
 
Issue 2 
 
Knife Attacks 
Issue 3 Vehicle Attacks 
Issue 4 
 
Knife Attacks 
Issue 5 Arson Attacks 
Issue 6 
 
- 
Issue 7 - 
Issue 8 
 
- 
 
Issue 9 
 
Hostage Taking 
6 Role of Instructional Material 
It is interesting to first examine what the groups themselves say about the West’s 
reaction to these ‘how-to-guide’ sections. Inspire’s chief editor openly mocks the 
West’s fixation on the sections, writing that “[t]he kuffar [disbelievers] are so terri-
fied by this section. In fact, they limit the weight of the magazine on this section 
alone, while they forget that all a Muslim needs to fight the kuffar is enough Iman 
[faith] and the simplest of tools. Thus, the magazines [sic] content complete each 
                                                        
16
 C. Mortimer: Berlin attack: Isis magazine offered tips on carrying out Nice-style lorry assault Rumiyah offered 
tips and tricks to maximise the number of casualties. In: The Independent 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/stockholm-attack-sweden-lorry-truck-crash-terror-isis-
islamic-state-manhunt-latest-suspect-police-a7673527.html (8 April 2017); U. Friedman: The Terrifying Simplic-
ity of the Stockholm Attack “Very few actually comprehend the deadly and destructive capability of the motor 
vehicle,” an ISIS publication advises. In: The Atlantic 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/stockholm-truck-attack/511364/ (7 April 2017) 
  
  
 
 
 
    
    
  EUROPOL PUBLIC INFORMATION 9 / 17 
 
other”.17 The point is that, at least from the perspective of Inspire’s architects, the 
knowledge contained in OSJ is not most important for carrying out an attack, rather 
it is a shared understanding of the world as presented by AQAP. After all, Inspire, 
like Rumiyah, is dominated by content that is designed to shape the perceptions and 
polarise the support of its readership via a range of appeals wrapped in powerful 
narratives while operational content in either magazine takes up a handful of the 
40-50 pages that make up an issue. It follows that if instructional material was 
deemed most important for radicalising and operationalising supporters, this 
would be reflected in a much greater proportion of the magazine being devoted to 
such content. To motivate an individual to follow the advice contained in either 
AQAP’s or ISIS’ ‘how-to-guide’ requires an individual to perceive their actions as 
not just justified, but an urgent necessity within at least a wider politico-military 
strategy if not a cosmic struggle. 
7 Competitive Systems of Meaning 
A key purpose of violent extremist propaganda is to provide supporters with a 
‘competitive system of meaning’, i.e. through which it seeks to shape its reader-
ship’s perceptions, polarise their support and radicalise them towards legitimising 
and engaging in terrorism.18 While space considerations will not allow an in-depth 
analysis here, groups like ISIS and AQAP variously interplay in-group identity, Oth-
er, crisis and solution constructs into cyclically self-reinforcing narratives.19 As 
graphically represented in Figure 1, both ISIS and AQAP present themselves as 
champions of the in-group identity (Sunni Muslims) and everyone else as out-group 
identities (Others) as enemies responsible for crises that only they (i.e. AQAP or 
ISIS) are able to solve. Consequently, the more that perceptions of crisis can be in-
creased and attached to Others the greater the sense of urgency for the in-group to 
implement solutions (and vice versa). As perceptions of crisis become increasingly 
acute, it follows that solutions need to be more and more extreme. 
                                                        
17
 Y. Ibrahim: Inspired by 'Inspire’. In: Inspire Magazine 11 https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/inspire-
magazine-issue-11.pdf p.19 (2013) 
18
 H.J. Ingram: An Analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's Propaganda War. In: 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (40)5 http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1212551 
(2017) 
19
 H.J. Ingram (2016) ‘Deciphering the Siren Call of Militant Islamist Propaganda: Meaning, Credibility & Behav-
ioural Change’. The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 9 https://icct.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/ICCT-Ingram-Deciphering-the-Siren-Call-of-Militant-Islamist-Propaganda-
September2016.pdf. 
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Figure 1: System of Meaning 
Groups like ISIS and AQAP understand that the deeper supporters can be coaxed in-
to this psychological web and adopt this as their lens through which to understand 
the world, the easier it becomes to convince them to engage in acts of violence. 
Take issue 9 of Rumiyah as an example. The issue opens with its feature article ti-
tled ‘The ruling on the belligerent Christians’ stating:20 
At a time when Muslims are being killed in the east and in the west – 
men, women, children, and the elderly altogether – and when the mush-
rikin and murtaddin are deploying all manner of destructive weaponry 
against them, raining devastation on their villages and towns, the evil 
scholars, the preachers of misguidance, and the tawaghit of the demo-
cratic parties are busy weeping over every mushrik struck by the hands 
of the mujahidin and disavowing themselves of every attack carried out 
against their Crusader allies, claiming that Islam does not permit such 
deeds and accusing those who carry them out of tarnishing the reli-
gion’s image. Their sinful tongues and filthy pens even go so far as to 
give those harbi (belligerent) kuffar protection with respect to their 
blood and their wealth, and to defame the noble muwahhidin, who car-
                                                        
20
 The ruling on the belligerent Christians. In: Rumiyah 9, pp.5-10 (2017) 
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ried out Allah’s judgment on the mushrikin and, through their blessed 
deeds – not just their words – revived shar’i rulings which the tawaghit 
and their allies endeavored to either wipe out or replace. From among 
these blessed deeds were the successive attacks which the soldiers of 
the Islamic State in Misr and Sinai carried out against the Christians in 
those lands, targeting them with killings and assassinations, and afflict-
ing their churches with burning and explosions.21 
It should be clear from this quote how ISIS seeks to increase perceptions of crisis in 
their audience, attaching responsibility for that malaise to not only those outside of 
the in-group identity but traitors within it, to justify and legitimise violence. Ex-
treme crisis requires extreme solutions. This is what follows before the ‘Just Terror 
Tactics’ section: 
- A one page infographic identifying five reasons why ‘Jews and Christians’ 
are enemies then appears,22  
- A rehashed article by ISIS’ deceased founder Abu Musab al-Zarqawi titled 
‘And likewise the Messengers are afflicted, then the final outcome is theirs 
(Part 2)’,23  
- Another infographic titled ‘Seven shaded by Allah in his shade’,24  
- An article for women ‘The woman is a shepherd in her husband’s home and 
responsible for her flock’,25  
- An article by Shaykh Sulayman Ibn ‘Abdillah Ibn Muhammad Ibn ‘Abdil-
Wahab titled ‘They took their scribes and monks as lords besides Allah’,26  
- An ‘exclusive’ content article ‘Be patient, for indeed the promise of Allah is 
true’ by ‘The Mujahid Shaykh Abul-Hasan Al-Muhajir’,27 
                                                        
21
 Ibid, p.5 
22
 Ibid, p.11 
23
 Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi: And likewise the Messengers are afflicted, then the final outcome is theirs (Part 2). 
In: Rumiyah 9, pp.12-16 (2017) 
24
 Seven shaded by Allah in his shade. In: Rumiyah 9, p. 17 (2017) 
25
 The woman is a shepherd in her husband’s home and responsible for her flock. In: Rumiyah 9, p. 18-21 
(2017) 
26
 Shaykh Sulayman Ibn: Abdillah Ibn Muhammad Ibn Abdil-Wahab, They took their scribes and monks as lords 
besides Allah. In: Rumiyah 9, pp.22-25 (2017) 
27
 Abul-Hasan Al-Muhajir: Be patient, for indeed the promise of Allah is true. In: Rumiyah 9, pp.26-35 (2017) 
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- The third article in ‘The establishment of the Islamic State’ series titled ‘The 
Twelver Rafidah from a fabricated claim to a non-existent Imam’,28 
- The regular ‘Military and Covert Operations’ section outlining military ac-
tions across ISIS’ wilayats and beyond,29 
- Finally, an infographic titled ‘Epic Battles of Mosul’ featuring operational 
statistics.30 
The ‘Just Terror Tactics’ section on hostage-taking then appears. It should be clear 
that the instructional content is deeply embedded in existential, historical, juris-
prudential and strategic narratives that variously seek to not only increase Other-
generated crisis and the need for an ISIS-generated solution but increasingly coax 
supporters into adopting ISIS’ ‘competitive system of meaning’. The instructional 
material, much of which is readily available online with a simple Google search, is 
merely a bonus. Inspire’s editor reminds us of the shared strategic logic: ‘…all a 
Muslim needs to fight the kuffar is enough Iman [faith] and the simplest of tools’.31 
Furthermore, violent extremists will respond to acts of terrorism, especially so-
called ‘inspire’ attacks, by describing the perpetrators as heroic members of their 
organisations, inflating their actions as part of a broader movement and politico-
military campaign. It is a post-incident messaging strategy designed to encourage 
future operatives. The obvious question to emerge is how can this propaganda 
strategy be confronted by CT-CVE practitioners. 
8 Proactive and Post-Incident CT-CVE Strategic Communi-
cation Recommendations  
Two key findings can be drawn from the preceding analysis. First, violent extrem-
ists embed instructional material within a broader sea of narratives that are de-
signed to legitimise, justify and inspire engagement in violence. A proactive CT-CVE 
strategic communications approach is required to address this aspect of the vio-
lence extremist strategy. Second, post-incident messaging from groups like ISIS and 
                                                        
28
 The Twelver Rafidah from a fabricated claim to a non-existent Imam. In: Rumiyah 9, pp.36-41 (2017) 
29
 Military and Covert Operations. In: Rumiyah 9, pp.42-44 (2017) 
30
 Epic Battles of Mosul. In: Rumiyah 9, p.45 (2017) 
31
 Y. Ibrahim: Inspired by 'Inspire’. In: Inspire Magazine 11, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/inspire-
magazine-issue-11.pdf (2013) 
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AQAP are designed to inspire a ‘copycat’ effect in audiences while reinforcing the 
group’s overarching message. A post-incident communications strategy is required 
to address this aspect of the violent extremist strategy. Upon this basis, the follow-
ing recommendations draw upon the ‘linkage-based’ approach to counter-
terrorism strategic communications.32 
8.1 Proactive Recommendations 
The ‘linkage-based’ approach to CT-CVE strategic communications recommends the 
deployment of messaging that are designed to dissolve the ‘linkages’ violent ex-
tremists make between themselves and solutions and their enemies and crisis (see 
Figure 1). Put simply, the entire strategy is calibrated to undermine the ‘competi-
tive system of meaning’ championed by jihadist groups like ISIS and AQAP. While 
space considerations will not allow an in-depth analysis of the ‘linkage-based strat-
egy, it is worthwhile considering three elements: core narrative, message variety 
and synchronicity of message and action. 
8.2 A Core Narrative 
A key lesson that we could learn from AQ and ISIS is to have a clear and simple core 
narrative that is supported by a variety of messages. There has been a tendency in 
counter-narrative campaigns to focus on individual messages rather than on creat-
ing a narrative constructed by a set of inter-locking messages. As we have seen, the 
strength of messages is not individual, but rather how they reinforce each other to 
create a coherent narrative supporting a system of meaning. Simply put, the sum is 
greater than the individual parts. Hence it is crucial that CT strategic communica-
tion campaigns are anchored around a core, but simple, narrative which allows the 
messages to build on and reinforce one another, otherwise the messages risk seem-
ing incoherent and contradicting. 
                                                        
32
 H.J. Ingram (2016) ‘The strategic logic of the “linkage-based” approach to combating militant Islamist propa-
ganda’, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 8, no. 6 https://icct.nl/publication/the-
strategic-logic-of-the-linkage-based-approach-to-combating-militant-islamist-propaganda-conceptual-and-
empirical-foundations/. 
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8.3 A Variety of Messaging 
A variety of messaging types should be deployed, not just a variety of messages.33 
Individuals may be more receptive to different types of messages, and different 
types of messaging will build to support each other. In particular, this should con-
tain: 1) Rational choice and Identity based messages. ISIS will often for example 
fuse identity messages, such as that it is your duty as a Muslim to come and join the 
caliphate, with rational choice arguments that highlight the quality of life you would 
enjoy living within the caliphate. Through providing both types of messages you 
can appeal to a wider spectrum of people, but more importantly the two messages 
are mutually reinforcing. 2) Offensive and Defensive messages. Counter message 
campaigns are inherently defensive, however past campaigns show that they are 
most effective when combined with offensive messaging, with emphasis on the lat-
ter. Whilst defensive messaging focusses on the opposition’s message, going on the 
offensive gives the opportunity to get your key messages across.34 
8.4 Synchronise Message and Action 
Communication is not just what you say, but the totality of what you say and do. 
Messages lose their credibility and hence impact, when there is a disparity between 
message and action. Hence care should be taken to ensure that message and action 
are closely synchronised together to increase effectiveness. Further, a key messag-
ing technique of both AQ and ISIS, to expose the say-do-gap, between what western 
governments say on the one hand and the policies they enact on the other. Through 
synchronisation, this area of attack is minimised, and in turn allows the focus to be 
put on exposing the say-do-gap of the opposition.35 
8.5 Post-incident Messaging Response: Inspired-attacks 
Distinguishing between ‘directed’ and ‘inspired’ attacks is important for identifying 
opportunities and risks for countering this threat. Directed attacks, while in theory 
having a greater potential for lethality, also provide security and law enforcement 
                                                        
33
 H. J. Ingram and A. Reed (2016). “Lessons from History for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communica-
tions”, The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 4 https://www.icct.nl/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/ICCT-Ingram-CTSC-June-2016-3.pdf. 
34
 A. Reed (2017) ‘IS Propaganda: Should We Counter the Narrative?’, The International Centre for Counter-
Terrorism – The Hague, https://icct.nl/publication/is-propaganda-should-we-counter-the-narrative/. 
35
 H. J. Ingram and A. Reed (2016). “Lessons from History for Counter-Terrorism Strategic Communications” 
https://icct.nl/publication/lessons-from-history-for-counter-terrorism-strategic-communications/. 
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agencies with more opportunities for discovery compared to ‘inspired’ attackers 
who have little to no contact with a central organisation. While it may seem coun-
terintuitive, increasing the incentives for groups to engage in directed attacks while 
diminishing incentives for ‘inspired’ attacks has the benefit of increasing opera-
tional risks upon these groups rather than affording them ‘free kicks’ with inspired 
attacks. Building on the proactive recommendations outlined above, post-incident 
messaging should focus on plainly and factually describing events for what they 
are: cowardly criminal violence targeting innocents. If the incident is an ‘inspired’ 
attack and, as is often the case, the attacker has a history of criminality, mental ill-
ness or is ignorant of their own supposed motivations, it presents an opportunity 
for governments to set a ‘trap’ for militant Islamists by derisively predicting that 
they will claim the cowardly actions of a disturbed criminal reflecting their desper-
ation. This leaves the violent extremists with two options: 
1. Acknowledge the perpetrator as their ‘inspired’ attacker. The follow-up 
messaging to such a response is to highlight how that messaging reinforc-
es the themes within the original message augmented by newly-available 
information.  
2. The perpetrator is not officially acknowledged by ISIS. This is ideal be-
cause it means the violent extremists have missed an opportunity to claim 
an attack. Government messaging merely acknowledges the accuracy of 
their original description of the attack as a cowardly criminal act.  
9 Conclusion 
Although often perceived as a new phenomenon, the instructional guides in jihadist 
magazines such as OSJ and JT are, in reality, the latest iteration of a long history of 
instructional material. In our response to jihadist propaganda we need to be careful 
that we do not place too much weight on these guides in themselves, for they only 
make sense when seen in their place within the wider context of jihadist propagan-
da. The instructional material is of little value unless the reader can be convinced to 
adopt the groups’ competitive system of meaning. Ultimately, strategic communica-
tion efforts should focus on dissolving the system of meaning championed by vio-
lent extremists and, in doing so, undermine the mechanisms used to legitimise and 
justify engaging in terrorist violence. However, an essential part of this strategy 
must be the implementation of appropriate post-incident messaging to minimise 
the ‘copycat’ effect and reinforce broader CT-CVE messaging themes. 
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